

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 05-04-2010		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Command and Control of Special Operations Aviation: Doctrinal Challenges in a Multi-Theater Operation		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Bradley D. Osterman Paper Advisor : CDR Dalton, James		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy. Joint doctrine explains and directs the way the U.S. Armed Forces organizes, plans, prepares, and executes military operations. It also provides guidance for establishing critical command relationships across the battlefield. Over the past nine years, continuous multi-theater combat operations have exposed seams and shortcomings concerning command and control arrangements within joint doctrine. This paper highlights a critical omission in the complex world of special operations aviation command and control, and offers recommendations on how to improve existing joint doctrine to facilitate successful supporting command relationships within the geographic combatant command structure to ensure successful implementation of special operations air component forces into the joint task force commander's mission.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Joint Special Operations Air Component, Joint Special Operations Air Detachment, SOF Command and Control					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: UNCLASSIFIED			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 23	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**Command and Control of Special Operations Aviation:
Doctrinal Challenges in a Multi-Theater Operation**

by

Bradley D. Osterman


Major, USA

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:

E-Signed by Bradley
VERIFY authenticity with ApproveIt



05 May 2010

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Abstract

Joint doctrine explains and directs the way the U.S. Armed Forces organizes, plans, prepares, and executes military operations. It also provides guidance for establishing critical command relationships across the battlefield. Over the past nine years, continuous multi-theater combat operations have exposed seams and shortcomings concerning command and control arrangements within joint doctrine. This paper highlights a critical omission in the complex world of special operations aviation command and control, and offers recommendations on how to improve existing joint doctrine to facilitate successful supporting command relationships within the geographic combatant command structure to ensure successful implementation of special operations air component forces into the joint task force commander's mission.

INTRODUCTION

Doctrine is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as: something that is taught, or a statement of a military principle or set of strategies.¹ Joint Doctrine is designed to assist members of the Armed Forces of the United States to operate successfully together. The Joint Publication (JP) series is a bridge between policy and doctrine.²

The JP Series defines specific roles, responsibilities and the functional application of military capabilities within its volumes. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations provides basic concepts and principles to guide the Services, combatant commanders, and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to prepare for and conduct special operations. It describes these military operations and provides general guidance for military commanders to employ and execute command and control (C²) of special operations forces (SOF) when assigned to a geographic combatant commander (GCC), subordinate unified commander, or a joint task force (JTF) commander.³

JP 3-05 is clear and concise in its guidance on the employment of SOF forces, but there are always situations and scenarios that arise where doctrine is just not enough. Luckily, the doctrine itself understands this and states that: it is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

¹ <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/doctrine>, accessed 13 April, 2010.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Pub 1 (Washington, DC: 20 March 2009) I-1.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Pub 3-05, (Washington, DC: 17 December 2003) I-1.

The author's thesis is that joint doctrine must be amended to include a Joint Special Operations Air Detachment as a subordinate element to the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) and adjust its C² arrangements to properly manage a multi-theater conflict within the same GCCs Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Current Joint Doctrine focuses primarily on armed conflict in a single theater of war within a GCC's AOR, but simultaneous joint operations with different military end states can be conducted within the same AOR. In the extreme, separate major operations within a theater may be initiated or remain ongoing while a global campaign is being waged (e.g., Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) during the Global War on Terror (GWOT)).⁴ This extreme case has become the prevailing operational paradigm for the last seven plus years in the United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM) AOR.

This historic and continuous multi-theater, multi-joint task force situation hasn't always fit the doctrinal model of joint command and control. In particular, multi-theater commitments have affected the doctrinal C² of Special Operations Aviation (SOA) causing friction between those commanders it was designed to support. With two theaters of operations occurring simultaneously with Iran wedged in between causing extended lines of communications over 1500 miles long, SOA forces have struggled to ensure that the correct force mix is in the right place to affect the supported JTF commander's SOF mission.

This paper will address the author's perceived SOA C² shortcomings as it attempts to answer the question: What changes need to be made to Joint Doctrine to accurately depict how the JSOAC is commanded and controlled within the GCC's AOR in a multi-theater

⁴ JP 1, I-18.

conflict scenario. This paper will not address Joint Special Operations Command's (JSOC) aviation assets.

Background

To fully understand the problem, it is critical to understand the Special Operations Aviation (SOA) forces and their doctrine. SOA consists of fixed and rotary wing assets primarily from both the Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) that form a vital component of any Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).

Army Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA) primarily consists of elements of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR). This unit, headquartered at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, is tasked with the mission to organize, equip, train, resource and employ Army special operations aviation forces worldwide in support of contingency missions and warfighting commanders.⁵ The 160th has a strategic composition of light, medium and heavy helicopters, all highly modified and designed to meet the unit's unique mission requirements. The SOAR supports other SOF units by conducting special air operations in all operational environments. The specially organized, trained, and equipped aviation units give the Joint Force Special Operations Component (JFSOC) Commander the capability to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate SOF elements engaged in all core tasks, missions, and environments.⁶

⁵ <http://www.soc.mil/160soar/160soar.html> accessed 14 March 2010.

⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.60 (Washington, DC: 30 October 2007) pg 1-1.

ARSOA integration is dependent upon JP 3-05 and 3-05.1 for integration into the joint warfighting environment and further refines its operations using its specific service doctrine. Field Manual (FM) 3-05.60, *Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations*, describes the core tasks, capabilities, limitations, C2 relationships, employment principles, and operational considerations of the Army Special Operations Aviation Regiment. It delineates unique capabilities, limitations, and requirements when supporting a standing joint special operations task force or a geographic combatant commander during a regional operation.⁷ FM 3-05.60 is nested inside of JP 3-05 and 3.05.1 with few exceptions and is complemented by Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7 *Special Operations*.

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) provides Air Force special operations forces for worldwide deployment and assignment to regional unified commands.⁸ AFSOC consists of a pair of Special Operations Wings (SOW) each dedicated to a specific function that provides the preponderance of fixed wing and unmanned aerial vehicle support to SOF.

The 1st SOW's mission focus is unconventional warfare: counter-terrorism, combat search and rescue, personnel recovery, psychological operations, aviation assistance to developing nations, "deep battlefield" resupply, interdiction and close air support.⁹ 1st SOW utilizes a mix of MC/AC-130's, CV-22's, and U-28A aircraft. 1st SOW also assesses, trains, advises, and assists foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment and force integration using a variety of aircraft.

The 27th SOW's primary mission is to provide infiltration/exfiltration, combat support, helicopter and tilt-rotor aerial refueling, psychological warfare, and other special

⁷ FM 3-05.60, pg v.

⁸ <http://www.afsoc.af.mil/units/index.asp> Accessed 14 April 2010.

⁹ <http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3485> accessed 14 April 2010.

missions.¹⁰ They utilize a mix of MC/AC-130's, PC-12's and the MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicles.

Just like ARSOA, AFSOC relies on its own service doctrine to further define its methods. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7 *Special Operations* describes the support AFSOC provides to Joint Force Commander (JFC) and reiterates the command relationships that allow the JFC to leverage AFSOF capabilities as part of a greater campaign plan. This operational doctrine document guides how to employ AFSOF to meet today's threats.¹¹

Ultimately, SOA provides selective, flexible deterrent options or crisis response capabilities to achieve operational objectives. Special operations forces, however, must complement, not compete with nor be a substitute for, conventional forces. The need for an opportunity to attack or engage strategic or operational targets with small units drives the formation of special units with specialized, highly focused capabilities. Although not always decisive on their own, special operations can be designed and conducted to create conditions favorable to U.S. strategic aims and objectives. Often, these operations may require clandestine or low visibility capabilities and are applicable across the range of military operations.¹²

Command and Control of SOA

In order to capitalize on SOA's unique capabilities and characteristics, clear lines of command and control must be established to blend the SOA assets from multiple services into a cohesive and effective supporting force. To properly integrate and utilize special

¹⁰ <http://www.cannon.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=12749> accessed 14 April 2010.

¹¹ Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7, *Special Operations*, Maxwell AFB, AL, 16 December 2005, forward.

¹² Ibid, pg 3.

operations forces, it is important to understand the command and control structure and how that affects the integration of SOF and SOA forces into the JTF. JP 3-05 and JP 3-05.01 delineate clearly how to successfully organize and control SOF/SOA within a single JTF (see Figure 1).

The GCC normally exercises combatant command (COCOM) of assigned and operational control (OPCON) of attached SOF through the commander of a Theater Special Operations Component (TSOC), a sub unified command.¹³




Figure 1, Theater-Level Special Operations C², (JP 3-05.01, pg III-1)

Doctrinally, the TSOC Commander has three primary roles. First, as a Joint Force Commander and as such, has the authority to plan and conduct joint operations and exercises OPCON of assigned and attached forces. The second role, is the theater special operations advisor to the GCC on the proper employment of SOF/SOA. Finally, is designated as the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander by the GCC.¹⁴

Depending on the size, scope, or combat intensity of the operation, the JFSOCC commander will establish one or more Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF) to

¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, Joint Pub 3-05.01, (Washington, DC: 26 April 2007) III-2.

¹⁴ JP 3-05, pg III-4 to III-5.

conduct a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a larger joint operation or theater campaign (see Figure 2). Figure 2 represents a doctrinal model to properly manage Special Operations Forces within a GCC's theater of operations. The JFSOC doctrinally retains control of the SOA assets within the AOR when multiple JSOTFs exist in the same theater of operations. This C2 arrangement allows the JFSOC to prioritize SOA between the JSOTF's to ensure all are meeting the overall JTF Commanders mission (see Figure 2).




Figure 2, Notional JFSOCC C², (JP 3-05, pg III-6)

JP 3-05.01 addresses further allocating Army Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA) assets directly down to the forces they are directly supporting. “ARSOA are normally attached to a JSOTF. OPCON may be exercised by the CDRJSOTF through either functional or Service components of the JSOTF, depending on the specific situation. When a JSOAC Commander is established as a functional component of a JSOTF, the JSOTF normally exercises OPCON of all assigned and attached joint SOA assets through the JSOAC Commander.”¹⁵ This is further complemented by Army doctrine.

FM 3-05.60 recommends delegation to either the JSOAC or directly to the SOF ground commander. Dependent upon mission requirements, it may be determined that the

¹⁵ JP 3-05.01, pg III-4.

JSOAC may not be the best method to C² the SOAR. Experience has shown that in certain circumstances efficiencies are gained when SOAR assets are directly under the C2 of the combined JSOTF, who task-organizes the SOAR to best meet mission requirements (See Figure 3).¹⁶




Figure 3, Typical JSOAC Command Relationships, (FM 3-05-60, pg II-4)

Not to be left out, the Air Force further supports the C² relationships of SOA within the various levels of command. The Air Force takes one further step to ensure that AFSOC forces are best utilized and not mismanaged by stating that the Air Force prefers – and in fact, plans and trains- to employ forces through a Commander Air Force Special Operations Force (COMAFSOF) who is normally dual-hatted as the JSOAC Commander.¹⁷ The reference to Air Forces working for Air Force commanders is understandable and serves as a mechanism to ensure unity of command and the most effective use of limited special operations assets.

Joint doctrine and supporting service publications correctly and adequately support most all of the GCC single theater conflicts and situations requiring SOF and SOA

¹⁶ FM 3-05.60, pg 1-9.

¹⁷ AFDD 2-7, pg 19.

integration into the JTF Commander's plan. Recently several GCC's have recognized the importance of the JSOACs capabilities and have established standing JSOAC staffs capable of immediate, well rehearsed, and functional SOA C² structures for crisis operations.

Single Theater C2 of SOA

Joint doctrine is written with a single theater of operations in mind. In this scenario, the GCC is conducting activities across the range of military operations within a single joint area of operations. To address the smaller and shorter duration operations, it is highly likely that the JSOAC works as an OPCON force directly for the JSOTF (see Figure 4). This arrangement is prevalent when the JSOTF Commander is also acting as the JFSOC Commander.




Figure 4, Notional JFSOTF Elements, (JP 3-05, pg III-7)

The TSOC Commander in this situation still retains direct authority over the JSOTF, but functions in an advisory role to the GCC and the JTF Commander.

In a more robust or politically sensitive operation, the TSOC Commander can retain the authority as the JFSOC Commander and subordinates forces directly to the established

JTF Commander on the ground. During operations in Colombia in February of 2008, U.S. Southern Command's TSOC Commander acted as the JFSOC Commander and designated an Army Colonel as the JSOTF Commander. He and his staff worked closely with the Air Force Lieutenant Colonel acting as the JSOAC Commander at the JTF headquarters in Bogota.¹⁸

With elements of the JSOAC spread throughout the countryside, the JSOAC controlled the fixed and rotary wing air requirements to prosecute intelligence as they attempted to narrow down the search for the three U.S. hostages held captive since February of 2003. To further ease mission execution timelines for the ARSOA assets, the JSOAC authorized direct coordination with the JSOTF forces they were co-located with, while the ARSOA Liaison Officer (LNO) at the JSOAC headquarters kept the staff informed. Due to the time sensitivity of the emerging missions, JSOTF control and direct tasking of the SOA rotary wing assets was authorized. This ensured quick and effective execution to emerging actionable intelligence.¹⁹

Multi-Theater C² of the CJSOAC

As Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began to develop in late September 2001, SOF air and ground forces quickly moved into action inside Afghanistan utilizing two separate JSOTF's. Task Force (TF) DAGGER was commanded by the 5th Special Forces Commander, COL John F. Mulholland initially based from Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan. Once in place, TF DAGGER was directed to conduct special operations in support of a number of Northern Alliance (NA) commanders in Afghanistan and to work

¹⁸ MAJ Chad Chasteen, Battalion Operations Officer, 3-160th SOAR (A) Interview 21 March 2010.

¹⁹ MAJ Erik Vanek, Former Commander of C/3-160th SOAR (A) Interview 20 March 2010.

with them to gain their active assistance in overthrowing the Taliban regime concentrated on operations in the northern portions of Afghanistan.²⁰

In early December 2001, TF K-Bar, initially based in Oman, was built around a SEAL detachment. Also included were German KSK, New Zealand SAS, Canadian JTF-2, and Danish SOF detachments. A major element of TF K-BAR's work was sensitive site exploitation -the surveillance and raiding of locations in southern Afghanistan suspected of containing al-Qaeda or senior Taliban related individuals, arms and intelligence materials.²¹

Each JSOTF was activated separately, had a specific mission, and was geographically separated so each retained direct control and authority over its respective JSOAC element (see figure 5).²² JP 3-05.01 clearly states that in certain cases when there are multiple JSOTFs, the JSOAC will remain under the OPCON of the JFSOCC.²³ OEF is a distinctive example of how SOF showed its ability to adjust to conditions rather than fight rigidly according to doctrine. The benefit to this arrangement allowed each TF to retain its ASOA asset to facilitate the exacting coordination necessary to conduct time sensitive direct action missions. With JSOAC's established in both TFs within the same AOR, a problem did emerge with regards to the limited, but highly sought after AFSOC resources. The problem was further exacerbated when the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) tried to directly task the AFSOC assets.

²⁰Dr. Richard W. Stewart, "Operation Enduring Freedom" The US Army Center for Military History Publication 70-83-1 pg 10.
<http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm> Accessed 21 March 2010.

²¹ Johann Price "Operation Enduring Freedom Chain of Command"
<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/OEFcommand-pr.cfm>, accessed 28 March 2010.

²² F. Mario Olivera, Jr., "Taming the Beast: Integrating Conventional and special Operations Forces Communications" (monograph, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: United States Air Force Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 2006), pg 4, <https://www.afresearch.org/AU/ACSC/3803/AY06> (accessed 26 March 2010).

²³ JP 3-05, pg III-7.




Figure 5, OEF C²

Problems associated with tasking authority did develop. Without a centralized JSOAC under the direct control of the JFSOCC, issues pertaining to the control of the AC-130 gunships, and certain aspects of the combat search and rescue (CSAR) mission became sticking points between SOF and conventional authorities. On occasions, the JFACC felt that the AC-130 gunships were theirs to task directly, when in fact SOF retained that authority and had allowed Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) to utilize the few available sorties for their usage if no other SOF requirements arose. The problem could have been solved with centralized JSOAC control, but was eventually fixed by utilizing the SOF LNOs in the CFAC and the Special Operations Command Coordination Element (SOCCE) assigned to the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFACC).

The successes realized by the early JSOTFs were a mix of doctrine and lessons learned. As OEF continued, a new C² problem would emerge as the United States entered into combat operations in a second theater with the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003. With

over nine months to plan the operations and several geographic similarities, C² of SOA became an even more difficult task.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began much like OEF had in that multiple JSOTFs were first established outside the JOA and were geographically non-supportive of each other. Furthermore, the JFSOC Commander was located at a third location (See Figure 6).²⁴




Figure 6, OIF C²

By itself, the C² established for OIF would have been just as adequate as it was for OEF, but with continuing SOF commitments remaining in Afghanistan, command and control became exponentially difficult. With two independent JSOAC's in the Afghanistan Theater directly supporting the JSOTFs, it became evident that an overarching SOA control organization would need to be established to further control the dwindling availability of AFSOC assets and provide guidance to the USCENTCOM staff as to which JSOTF would receive priority.

USCENTCOM established the JSOAC in Qatar to run the entire AOR's SOA commitments. To ensure the correct relationships, the C² organizations previously labeled

²⁴Olivera, Jr., *Taming the Beast*, pg 5.

JSOACs would be downgraded to a new non-doctrinal term: Joint Special Operations Aviation Detachment (JSOAD). The JSOAD is essentially what JP 3-05.01 calls an Air Force Special Operations Detachment (AFSOD). AFSOD is a squadron-size headquarters that could be a composite organization composed of different Air Force special operations assets. The detachment is normally subordinate to an Air Force special operations component, joint special operations task force, or joint task force, depending upon size and duration of the operation.²⁵

The main difference between the doctrinal AFSOD and the ad hoc JSOAD was that the Army Special Operations Aviation Regiment (ARSOA or SOAR) element that was actually assigned to the JSOAD would not normally be controlled by either the JSOAD or the JSOAC Commander. It would normally be under Operational Control (OPCON) of the JSOTF to eliminate levels of bureaucracy that are detrimental to speed and simplicity. Often times, SOAR assets are co-located in extremely austere forward locations with the SOF they support.

At first there were few additional problems with this ad hoc arrangement, but when the security situation changed and the missions for SOF inside of Iraq changed, the relocation of the JSOAC deep inside the combat zone created a wave of difficulties. The JSOAD had been controlling all SOA assets as they directly supported the single JSOTF inside the Iraq battle space successfully; it became a tug of war once its higher headquarters arrived in the neighborhood. The JSOAC now ran the show, but the ad hoc JSOAD continued to function causing extreme frustrations and confusion for the air assets. The SOA forces now had in effect two chains of command residing in the same building with differing requirements. It

²⁵ AFDD 2-7, pg 42.

wasn't until the JSOAC-Iraq staff was absorbed into the theater JSOAC that operations became mostly functional again.

Most recently, the USCENTCOM JSOAC, still positioned deep inside the Iraq battle space, made the decision to relocate their headquarters back to Qatar to be better situated to facilitate continuing operations in both the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. Early in 2011, the USCENTCOM JSOAC will be moving to a new facility on Al Udeid Airbase near Doha, Qatar. This will reestablish the JSOAC in Balad Iraq as the primary C² lead over SOA in Iraq allowing the Special Operations Component Command Central (SOCCENT) JSOAC to focus directly on USCENTCOM's SOA requirements.

Conclusion

Joint doctrine is a tremendous tool to establish effective command and control relationships. It provides the detailed framework that each service can utilize to establish the best practices and procedures to facilitate effect C². Although joint doctrine is written and easy to understand, it is not, and cannot be, the end-all for operational C².

Service doctrine takes the basic joint principles and further defines how those principles fit into the particular mission and scope of the individual service. It is clear that the service doctrines are written to support the joint doctrine, but are ultimately written to ensure its own place of prominence within the joint arena. To most that statement would seem jaded, but in reality the need is evident to ensure that specific service components with highly specialized equipment, personnel and mission capabilities are utilized in the correct manner to support the JTF Commander's ultimate goals.

After nearly nine years of continuous combat operations, the United States Armed Services have come a long way concerning doctrine. OEF and OIF have proved to be an excellent venue to vet the earlier publications and to build upon the successes while correcting those principals and procedures that weren't so effective. Doctrine is still lacking in the multi-theater, single GCC AOR fight.

What remains after the years of trial and error is that SOF and SOA forces by nature adapt and overcome adversity and will continue under the harshest of circumstances, and even the most confusing of C2 arrangements to provide the supported JTF Commanders the skills that no other forces in DOD can provide.

Recommendations

The way ahead is to augment and improve the already functional joint and service specific doctrine. The author's recommendations are designed to assist the GCC when a multi-theater conflict situation arises within the AOR that requires two or more functional JTF Commanders.

First there is a need to establish the doctrinal term Joint Special Operations Air Detachment (JSOAD). It should be defined as a staff element subordinate to the standing JSOAC or JSOTF when AFSOC and ARSOA assets are forward deployed. This concept is designed to co-locate forward with its supported air assets and provide on-scene command, control and SOA mission support regardless of size and duration of the operation.

Second, remove the term Air Force Special Operations Detachment (AFSOD) from JP 3-05.01. The term AFSOD appears to be similar in nature to a JSOAD, but the AFSOD is

defined as a squadron-size AFSOF unit that could be a composite organization composed of different United States Air Force (USAF) assets. The detachment normally is subordinate to a theater AFSOC, JSOTF, JSOAC, or JTF depending upon size and duration of the operation.²⁶ The defined term AFSOD suggests that it is purely an Air Force organization without Army or Navy SOF aircraft in its organizational structure.

The term AFSOD is only mentioned briefly in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7 within a single paragraph covering space operations and is without mention in the publications glossary. This expulsion from JP 3-05.01 should not cause any service issues with the Air Force, since the term is of little use already. JSOAC would further expand the AFSOD term by including all SOA assets in any combination. In the hierarchy of the theater C2 diagram, JSOAC would be subordinate to a JSOAC commander (See Figure 8).

For the past several years, the CJSOAC-Arabian Peninsula and CJSOAC-Afghanistan have utilized the JSOAC concept quite successfully. At the present time there are at least three JSOACs operating continuously in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere in USCENTCOMs AOR. JSOAC's have been established numerous times to support operations in U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) AOR.²⁷ The term JSOAC even appears in U.S. Army Corps of Engineer solicitations and project labels that were awarded military construction funds to complete their projects including a \$2.85 million operations facility that was completed to house the JSOAC-Iraq organization.²⁸

The third recommendation builds off of the first two by addressing the multi-theater conflict within the same GCC's AOR scenario. Doctrine is already written for multiple

²⁶ JP 3-05, pg III-5.

²⁷ Author's personal knowledge.

²⁸ COL Otis Hicks, Jr *USCENTAF A-7 AFFOR, Middle East Construction*, http://www.same.org/files/members/INTERNATIONAL_hicks.pdf, Accessed 17 March 2010.

JTF's within the AOR. JP3-05.01 clearly states that a JSOAC provides a theater wide capability. In certain cases when there are multiple JSOTFs, the JSOAC will remain under OPCON of the JFSOC.²⁹ The official establishment of JSOADs would then allow the GCC's JSOAC to be the single point of contact for the TSOC Commander to turn to for SOA issues affecting either theater or the entire AOR as doctrine calls for. To ensure the SOA's customers received unwavering support, the JSOADs would be placed under Tactical Control (TACON) to the JTF, JFSOC, or JSOTF they were supporting (See Figure 7). This arrangement would then capitalize on the strengths of the supporting/supported command relationship. The JSOAD would be direct support to the JTF commander and highly invested in the overall success of the JTF.




Figure 7, Multi-Theater JSOAC C² Recommendation

²⁹ JP 3-05.01, pg III-7.

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